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Abstract 
 
 
Indication with Further Analysis of Mispricing and Barriers to Arbitrage in Chinese 
Option Market 
 
A Five-Month Study on Sample Option 
 
 
by 
 
 
Hao Feng, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2013 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Tyler J. Brough 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
This thesis presents indication of mispricing of options in the Chinese option market, 
focusing on the very first and the most representative option in the Chinese option market. 
I used the Black-Scholes model to calculate the option price and compare the result to its 
real performance. The mispricing of sample option is statistically significant. With further 
analysis, I found out that underlying asset price and its volatility are the possible factors that 
most likely lead to mispricing. Because of the consistent mispricing, I investigated the 
industrial regulations from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and found 
proof with examples that barriers to arbitrages do affect the consistent mispricing. The 
barriers prevent arbitrageurs to take full advantage of mispriced options and stocks.  
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Background 
 
On Aug 22nd, 2005, Baosteel’s call option, known as Baosteel JTB1 (580000), began 
being traded in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It initiated the new Chinese option market. 
Until Dec 31st, 2009, there were, in total, 55 options traded in the Chinese stock market, 38 
in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 17 in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 2007, despite 
the fact that the Chinese option market is outnumbered compared to the option market in 
the Hong Kong (there were around 4500 options in the Hong Kong option market), the 
trading volume and the number of transactions made in the Chinese option market had 
outperformed the Hong Kong option market and ranked No. 1 in option markets across the 
world. For a pre-mature market with such high trading volume and transactions made, 
experts started to examine whether there were mispricing issues in the market. In this 
empirical study, I use a widely used model, the Black-Scholes model, to testify the 
mispricing issues. 
Barriers to Arbitrage 
 
In mature markets, such as the U.S and European markets, when there is a mispricing 
on an option, it will be arbitraged away as people start trading for an arbitrage, such as 
short selling. Because of the nature of trading for the purpose of maximizing profit, the 
window for arbitrage is always short. It is also an efficient way to keep the option reflecting 
its real value or at least close to its real value. However, compared to mature markets, the 
Chinese stock market is regulated under different rules. There are five major differences: 
1. No short selling for stocks (before 2010) 
2. T+1 trading rule for stocks and T+0 trading rule for options 
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3. Limited volatility on stocks and options 
4. Noise traders  and limited size of the option market 
With short selling, investors in the market can react to arbitrage opportunities in time. 
Figure 1 shows the short selling process in mature markets and potential difference in 
Chinese market. Investors who realize an overpriced stock P at its current price at $12 per 
share may borrow 100 shares of stock P. Investors sell out 100 shares of stock P next hour, 
after it reaches its real value at price $10 per share. Now, despite the cost on commissions, 
there is a $200 arbitrage profit. It also fixes mispricing issues by increasing the supply of 
stock P in the market. Unfortunately, in the Chinese market, the lack of a short selling 
mechanism does not allow investors to react fast enough to arbitrage. Even if short selling 
is allowed, under the constraint of the T+1 trading rule that stocks cannot be traded until 
the next trading day after being bought in, investors are bearing more risk of losing 
arbitrage opportunities or losing money with longer holding periods for stocks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The flow chart of short selling process in mature markets and potential 
differences in Chinese market. 
Lender
Arbitrageurs borrow 100 
shares stock P
Arbitrageurs sell 100 
shares of stock P at $12 
per share 
Arbitrageurs buy back 100 
shares of stock P at $10 per 
share
Arbitrageurs return 100 
shares of stock P to lender 
and keep profit of $2 per 
share
Arbitrageurs have to wait for next trading 
day to sell 100 shares of stock P 
No short selling 
mechanism in 
Chinese market 
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Investors who make decision on selling, holding, and buying trades with neither inside 
information nor fundamental data are called noise traders. In the Chinese market, there are 
lots of noise traders. Noise traders tend to follow the trends and over-react to good and bad 
news. When arbitrageurs are outmatched in numbers by noise traders, arbitrageurs are not 
be able to take full advantages of arbitrage opportunities. As with the example of stock P, 
with short selling mechanism, arbitrageurs would get the profit and fix overpricing of stock 
P. But when the impacts on the market from arbitrageurs are outmatched by noise traders, 
arbitrageurs’ behavior would be limited. If noise traders are going to be consistently 
optimistic or pessimistic on stock prices, the arbitraging trades would not be able to fix the 
existing mispricing and arbitrageurs may be exposed to the risk. 
Assuming, in the stock P example, while arbitrageurs try to obtain profit by short 
selling stock P, noise traders are consistently optimistic about stock P. The price of stock P 
may keep going up with a smaller supply of stock P in the market. This increases the risk 
of arbitrageurs buying back stock P and returning stocks to the lender. In the case of 
Baosteel JTB1, on Oct 27th, 2005, Baosteel JTB1 reached its lowest price at 0.69. Because 
investors in China, especially individual investors, are in favor of technical analysis, they 
considered this lowest price as a support level. Since then, without significant changes in 
its underlying asset, Baosteel JTB1 started the new round of rebound. 
For stocks, the volatility of every trading day is ±10 percent. For options, the limit 
for trading day T is Limit up = Option’s Closing Price T-1 + (Underlying Asset’s Closing 
Price T-1 * 10%) * 125% * Exercise Ratio. And for limit down for trading day T is Limit 
down = Option’s Closing Price T-1 - (Underlying Asset’s Closing Price T-1 * 10%) * 125% 
* Exercise Ratio. This policy, in some ways, is protection for the stocks (options) and its 
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investors from excessive increasing or decreasing. However, it also has its down side. 
Stocks and options can still be traded when they are at the limit up/down without going 
further up/down, despite the trading volume. It prevents the stocks and options from 
performing the way they should be. 
For example, yesterday closing price of a call option with an exercise ratio of 1:1 
was $5, and its underlying assets’ closing price yesterday was $20. For today’s trading, the 
underlying assets limit up and down would be $22 and $18. This call option would have a 
limit down at $2.5 per share and a limit up at $7.5 per share. Investors can still trade on 
this call option after it reaches its limit up or down. It will never go lower than $2.5 per 
share or higher than $7.5 per share, even as continuous trading may result in a higher 
volatility without the limits. This matches the result of excessive annualized implied 
volatility from Table 5 (Table 5 can be found on page 18). 
In common cases, when arbitrageurs realize an arbitrage opportunity on options, 
they would perform a conversion to obtain risk-free profit by longing underlying stock, 
buying its put options, and selling its call options at the same time in order to hedge their 
risk. 
For instance, suppose stock A is trading at $100 per share in August while its call 
option in September is trading at $4, and its put option in September is trading at $3. The 
arbitrageurs would long 100 shares of stock A and its put option and sell a call option with 
total cost of $10000 + $300 - $400 = $9900. Assuming stock A’s price goes up to $110 per 
share, put option expires worthless, and call option would expire in the money and get 
assigned. The arbitrageurs sell 100 shares of stock A as required at $10000 for a profit of 
$10000 - $9900 = $100. If, instead, the price of stock A drops to $90 per share, call option 
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expires worthless, and put option expires in the money. Arbitrageurs would exercise put 
option to sell 100 shares of stock A at $10000 for a profit of $10000 - $9900 = $100 as 
well. 
 
Figure 2. Conversion arbitrage process in mature markets and potential difference in               
Chinese market. 
 
In the Chinese market, since the option market is new, the size of the market is limited. 
There are limited numbers and kinds of options. Arbitrageurs sometimes cannot find the 
option they need to hedge their risk for arbitraging. In the example of stock A, if there is 
no put option for stock A, arbitrageurs would bear the risk of the price going down and 
they would not be able to perform conversion to obtain risk-free profit. Figure 2 shows the 
conversion arbitrage process in mature markets and potential difference in Chinese market. 
 
Arbitrageurs perform conversion
Long 100 shares of stock A at $100 per share;
Buy put option for 100 shares of stock A at $3 per share;
Sell call option for 100 shares of stock A at $4 per share.
Total cost: $9900
Price of stock A goes up from $100 per 
share to $110 per share
1. Put option expires
2. Call option got assigned    
(sell 100 shares of stock A at $100 per 
share for $10000)  
Total Profit: $100
Price of stock A goes down from $100 
per share to $90 per share
1. Call option expires
2. Exercise put option 
(sell 100 shares of stock A at $100 per 
share for $10000)
Total Profit: 
$100
Arbitrageurs may 
not be able to 
find appropriate 
call/put option to 
lock in risk-free 
profit. 
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The Black-Scholes model 
 
 
In this study, our Baosteel JTB1, a European call option [1], its payoff at maturity T 
with a strike price K and price of underlying asset at maturity S(T) is: 
C(T) = MAX [S(T) – K, 0] 
 
If S(T) > K at maturity, the option would be exercised to buy underlying asset at K 
and then sold for net payoff S(T) – K. If S(T) < K, then the option would not be exercised. 
The Black-Scholes formula for pricing call option at T=0 before maturity is given by: 
 
C(0) = S(0)*N(d1) – e-r*T * K*N(d2) 
 
where N(d) is the cumulative probability distribution for variables with a standard normal 
distribution of 0 mean and a standard deviation of 1. Here r is the continuously compounded 
risk-free interest rate, while d1 and d2 are as shown as: 
                                          d1 =  ln S(0)K + (r + 0.5 ∗ σ2) ∗ T
σ ∗ √T                                           d2 =  ln S(0)K + (r − 0.5 ∗ σ2) ∗ T
σ ∗ √T = d1 − σ√T 
 
 
Introduction of Baosteel 
 
        Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd (hereinafter referred as Baosteel Co., Ltd.) is the largest 
and most advanced integrated steel company in China. Baosteel Co., Ltd is also recognized 
as a world leading steel company by the global steel market. According to World Steel 
Dynamics, the company ranks No. 3 in the world in terms of comprehensive competency; 
it is also believed to have the greatest development potential. On Dec 6th, 2004, Baosteel 
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Co., Ltd’s credit rating was raised from BBB to BBB+ by Standard & Poor’s. The 
expectation on credit rating as stable. On July, 2005, Baosteel Co., Ltd was ranked No. 309 
in Fortune’s top global 500 companies. Originally Baosteel is founded as Solely State-
Founded Enterprise, which is under the regulation of the Enterprise Law in China. On Oct 
2005, it reformed and switched to State-Owned Sole Corporation, which is regulated by 
the Company Law in China.  
 
Empirical Study 
 
The data used in this empirical study is based on the five-month performance of 
Baosteel stock and Baosteel JTB1, including high frequency data of historical Baosteel 
price, historical daily closing prices of the Baosteel JTB1 [2]. Table 1 shows the details in 
contract of Baosteel JTB1. 
 
Table 1. Contract of Baosteel JTB1. 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows the details about the Baosteel JTB1, including the key variables I need 
for running the Black-Scholes model: strike price and total days for trading. 
Table 2 (Table 2 be found at page 16) shows the daily closing price of Baosteel, the 
underlying asset of Baosteel JTB1, years left on the option, which is calculated by dividing 
Stock Baosteel JTB1 Settlement Method Physical Delivery
Trading Code 580000 Shares Issued 3.877 Billion
Type European Call Trading Date Aug 22nd, 2005 to Aug 30th
2006
Right Proportion 1 Ending Date Aug 30th, 2006
Underlying Asset G Baosteel (600019.SH) Days 373
Strike Price (RMB) 4.5 Exercise Brief ES060830
Issued By Baosteel Exercise Code 582000
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number of days left by 365, and the observed call option price for every trading day from 
Aug 22nd, 2005 to Feb 28th, 2006. 
 
According to the Black-Scholes model: 
                                    d1 =  ln S(0)K + (r + 0.5 ∗ σ2) ∗ T
σ ∗ √T  
                                  d2 =  ln S(0)K + (r − 0.5 ∗ σ2) ∗ T
σ ∗ √T = d1 − σ√T 
 
                                C(0) = S(0)*N(d1) – e-r*T * K*N(d2) 
 
where N(d) is the standard normal distribution function; σ  is the volatility (standard 
deviation of the return on a stock); r is the continuously compounded risk-free interest rate; 
T is the time left until maturity in year; K is the strike price on stock; S is the current stock 
price. 
Based on the empirical data collected from Aug 22nd, 2005 to Feb 28th, 2006, I 
calculated the annualized historical volatility of Baosteel for every trading day based on 
the high frequency data. This high frequency data contains the daily price changes for, on 
average, every 11 seconds across the data. The risk-free rate was 3.3% from the 7 years 
national bonds yield to maturity from 2005 (r=3.3%). Years left, calculated by dividing the 
number of days left on the option by 365. I used the Black-Scholes model to calculate the 
daily, theoretically-predicted call option price for Baosteel JTB1. Table 3 below shows the 
comparison. 
In Table 3 (Table 3 can be found at page 17), the result shows that based on the 
theoretical predicted prices, over the 5 month period from Aug 22nd, 2005 to Feb 28th, 2006, 
the prices I observed were overpriced on every trading day during the period. Through 
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graph 4, the observation shows the observed Baosteel JTB1 call option has been overpriced 
over the five-month trading time in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
For statistic support, I used a t-test to test the hypothesis on overpricing. The null 
hypothesis (H0) is that this call option was not overpriced, and the alternative hypothesis 
(Ha) is that this call option was overpriced. The average difference between the predicted 
call price and observed call price is 101.21 percent. The standard deviation  
 
H0: μ ≤ 0 
Ha: μ > 0 
 
The t-test formula I used is: 
 tn−1 = X� − μs/√n 
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Graph 4. Trend of Baosteel JTB1 Option Price (Predicted and Observed) and 
Baosteel Closing Price
Option Price (observed) Predicted Baosteel Closing Price
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where μ stands for the average of population I used the average predicted price difference, 
which is 0.0 percent. X� stands for the average observed price difference of the sample, and 
s stands for the standard deviation of the sample. Table 4 shows the result. 
0.0%
101.2%
0.370 30.2122 *
Table 4. Result of the t-test on Hypothesis of Overpricing
122
121
*Significant at 1 percent level for one-tailed test
Average Predicted (μ)
Average Observed (X̅)
Sample Size (n)
Degree of Freedom
Standard Deviation (s) t-stat
 
 
 
As shown on Table 4, because the result is under the 1 percent significant level, I reject 
the null hypothesis, which means this call option was overpriced. At this point, I have 
indicated the mispricing on Baosteel JTB1 call option, specifically overpricing, on Baosteel 
JTB1. With evidence of mispricing, I continue to look into the model to find potential 
factors that lead to mispricing. 
 
Further Empirical Analysis  
 
In the Black-Scholes model, there are 5 variables: the underlying asset’s price, the 
strike price, the risk-free rate, the annual volatility, and time left on the option. I compared 
the option price sensitivity on each factor (except the strike price and time left on the option, 
because they are subjective variables that cannot be manipulated) based on the first trading 
day of the option [3]. 
 
1. Option Price’s Sensitivity on Risk-free Rate 
From the data I had, the risk-free rate for the period was 3.30%. To examine the 
impact, I picked up the range [2.80%, 3.80%], while holding the other variables (S = 4.63, 
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T = 1.0219, K = 4.50, Volatility = 40.4684%). I ran the data through the Black-Scholes 
model and the following graph 1 shows the result of the impact of the change of risk-free 
rate. The option price’s sensitivity to risk-free rate is also called Rho in Greeks. 
 
 
 
2. Option Price’s Sensitivity on Underlying Asset’s Price 
According to the historical data, the underlying asset Baosteel’s price on the first 
trading day was 4.63. To test the sensitivity of the option on underlying asset price, I 
simulated the scenario by picking the range of underlying asset price as [3.63, 5.63] while 
holding T = 1.0219, K = 4.50, Volatility = 40.4684%, r = 3.30%. Graph 2 shows the result. 
The option price’s sensitivity on underlying asset’s price is also called Delta in Greeks. 
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Graph 1. Predicted Price's Sensitivity to Risk-free Rate
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3. Option Price’s Sensitivity on Annual Volatility 
From the high frequency data I collected, I found the volatility for the first trading day 
for the option was 40.4684%. To simulate the scenario, I picked a Volatility of [10.47%, 
70.47%] while holding every other variable constant (T = 1.0219, K = 4.50, S = 4.63, r = 
3.30%). The following graph 3 shows the result. The option price’s sensitivity is also called 
Vega in Greeks. 
 
 
 
In conclusion, among the three cases, the risk-free rate has only a minor impact on 
option pricing. The option price is more sensitive to underlying asset price and annual 
volatility. 
Under these circumstances, I inverted the Black-Scholes model, calculated the daily 
annualized implied volatility based on high frequency data, and compared the result with 
the daily annualized historical volatility. Table 5 (Table 5 can be found at page 18) shows 
the annualized implied volatility and annualized historical volatility on a daily basis. 
Through the five-month-period, the daily annualized implied volatility is on average, 
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Graph 3. Predicted Price's Sensitivity on Volatility
Predicted Price
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101.21 percent above the daily annualized historical volatility level, which was the 
volatility the underlying asset has actually performed. 
I compared the trends of observed historical prices and theoretical prices, the trend 
of trading volume on Baosteel and the trend of trading volume on Baosteel JTB1. The 
results are in graphs 4, 5 and 6 (graph 4 can be found on page 9).  
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In Graph 4, the observation shows that from the end of October, 2005 to the middle 
of November, 2005, the Baosteel JTB1 price kept going up while the Baosteel price going 
down at the same time. This phenomenon is against the theory that the call option pricing 
is positively related to its underlying asset’s price.  
Graphs 5 and 6 are showing the trends of trading volume of Baosteel and Baosteel 
JTB1. The trading volume of Baosteel JTB1 is significantly higher than Baosteel. The 
graph 5 also shows that Baosteel JTB1 experienced a period of time with large scale trading 
volume. This momentum matches the phenomenon of Baosteel JTB1’s price change. These 
two facts may indicate that the pricing of Baosteel JTB1 and the relationship between the 
price of Baosteel and the price of Baosteel JTB1 have been compromised by speculation 
or manipulation. 
I cross-referenced the major news about Baosteel in 2005. From October to November 
2005, according to Baosteel’s Annual Report 2005 [5], there were several major events, 
such as signing a new strategic partnership with another leader from its industry and 
switching from Solely State-founded Enterprise to State-owned Sole Corporation, which 
is considered a huge potential positive impact on the company. With these proofs, I may 
conclude that there are sufficient motivations for people or investors speculating and 
manipulating the market of Baosteel JTB1. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this study, I conclude that the trading prices of the Baosteel JTB1 in reality are 
significantly above the prices that I derived from the Black-Scholes model. In this study, 
14 
 
different from using estimated given information like some similar studies, such as 
generally applying historical volatility of the entire five -month-period or 2004-2005, I 
calculated more accurate annualized volatility that derived from daily volatility based on 
high frequency data on underlying asset’s prices. This made the result more accurate. 
However, even under this circumstance, the theoretical prices derived based on the Black-
Scholes model are still significantly different from our observations. I also notice the 
irrational behaviors such as negative relationship between Baosteel and Baosteel JTB1’s 
prices and their trading volume. This indicates that there is a possibility that Baosteel JTB1 
may be manipulated. Based on the limited size of the market (only 3.877 billion shares 
were issued), the low price on option, the industrial barriers, and the factitious high trading 
volume, irrational investing or speculating may be the disruptive force on mispricing of 
Baosteel JTB1. By using examples and cases, I find explanation of how industrial barriers, 
under the regulations, lower the market efficiency and lead to mispricing on stocks and 
options. 
15 
 
Table 2. Historical Data of Baosteel JTB1. 
 
 
Date Baosteel Closing Years Left  Call(observed) Date Baosteel Closing Years Left  Call(observed) Date Baosteel ClosingYears Left  Call(observed) Date Baosteel ClosingYears Left  Call(observed)
2005/8/22 4.63 1.022 1.26 2005/10/11 4.05 0.885 1.03 2005/11/23 3.95 0.767 2.03 2006/1/9 4.13 0.638 1.581
2005/8/23 4.57 1.019 1.59 2005/10/12 4.04 0.882 1.03 2005/11/24 4 0.764 3.01 2006/1/11 4.07 0.633 1.605
2005/8/24 4.58 1.016 1.81 2005/10/13 4.02 0.879 1.05 2005/11/25 4.01 0.762 1.95 2006/1/12 4.08 0.630 1.52
2005/8/25 4.54 1.014 1.83 2005/10/14 4.2 0.877 1 2005/11/28 4 0.753 1.61 2006/1/13 4.04 0.627 1.499
2005/8/26 4.53 1.011 1.81 2005/10/17 4.1 0.868 0.95 2005/11/29 3.94 0.751 1.49 2006/1/16 3.96 0.619 1.526
2005/8/29 4.46 1.003 1.67 2005/10/18 4.09 0.866 0.93 2005/11/30 3.92 0.748 1.66 2006/1/17 3.95 0.616 1.512
2005/8/30 4.46 1.000 1.41 2005/10/19 4.05 0.863 0.91 2005/12/1 3.92 0.745 1.82 2006/1/18 3.99 0.614 1.455
2005/8/31 4.5 0.997 1.52 2005/10/20 4.04 0.860 0.91 2005/12/2 3.88 0.742 1.77 2006/1/19 4.07 0.611 1.462
2005/9/1 4.53 0.995 1.54 2005/10/21 4.02 0.858 0.86 2005/12/5 3.84 0.734 1.845 2006/1/20 4.06 0.608 1.385
2005/9/2 4.49 0.992 1.42 2005/10/24 4.03 0.849 0.87 2005/12/6 3.92 0.732 1.678 2006/1/23 4.1 0.600 1.212
2005/9/5 4.48 0.984 1.42 2005/10/25 4.03 0.847 0.84 2005/12/7 3.97 0.729 1.742 2006/1/24 4.06 0.597 1.086
2005/9/6 4.41 0.981 1.38 2005/10/26 3.95 0.844 0.72 2005/12/8 3.93 0.726 1.7 2006/1/25 4.08 0.595 1.044
2005/9/7 4.42 0.978 1.39 2005/10/27 3.89 0.841 0.69 2005/12/9 3.97 0.723 1.599 2006/2/6 4.16 0.562 1.372
2005/9/8 4.41 0.975 1.38 2005/10/28 3.94 0.838 0.77 2005/12/12 3.95 0.715 1.55 2006/2/7 4.15 0.559 1.62
2005/9/9 4.45 0.973 1.41 2005/10/31 3.96 0.830 1.12 2005/12/13 3.92 0.712 1.561 2006/2/8 4.15 0.556 1.575
2005/9/12 4.47 0.964 1.44 2005/11/1 3.9 0.827 0.97 2005/12/14 3.92 0.710 1.551 2006/2/9 4.14 0.553 1.599
2005/9/13 4.47 0.962 1.43 2005/11/2 3.94 0.825 0.99 2005/12/15 3.92 0.707 1.577 2006/2/10 4.16 0.551 1.533
2005/9/14 4.46 0.959 1.4 2005/11/3 3.89 0.822 1.12 2005/12/16 3.97 0.704 1.561 2006/2/13 4.14 0.542 1.645
2005/9/15 4.47 0.956 1.39 2005/11/4 3.93 0.819 1.31 2005/12/19 3.98 0.696 1.668 2006/2/14 4.12 0.540 1.646
2005/9/16 4.46 0.953 1.33 2005/11/7 3.91 0.811 1.51 2005/12/20 3.99 0.693 1.774 2006/2/15 4.16 0.537 1.625
2005/9/19 4.48 0.945 1.31 2005/11/8 3.91 0.808 1.65 2005/12/21 3.93 0.690 1.747 2006/2/16 4.09 0.534 1.562
2005/9/20 4.46 0.942 1.34 2005/11/9 3.91 0.805 1.16 2005/12/22 3.93 0.688 1.741 2006/2/17 4.11 0.532 1.476
2005/9/21 4.43 0.940 1.28 2005/11/10 3.84 0.803 1.4 2005/12/23 3.94 0.685 1.668 2006/2/20 4.14 0.523 1.646
2005/9/22 4.32 0.937 1.2 2005/11/11 3.8 0.800 1.61 2005/12/26 4.02 0.677 1.559 2006/2/21 4.3 0.521 1.624
2005/9/23 4.31 0.934 1.1 2005/11/14 3.79 0.792 1.78 2005/12/27 4.08 0.674 1.567 2006/2/22 4.33 0.518 1.698
2005/9/26 4.25 0.926 1.12 2005/11/15 3.8 0.789 1.66 2005/12/28 4.17 0.671 1.582 2006/2/23 4.35 0.515 1.64
2005/9/27 4.21 0.923 1.07 2005/11/16 3.92 0.786 1.87 2005/12/29 4.11 0.668 1.493 2006/2/24 4.37 0.512 1.67
2005/9/28 4.2 0.921 1.08 2005/11/17 3.85 0.784 1.93 2005/12/30 4.12 0.666 1.484 2006/2/27 4.31 0.504 1.66
2005/9/29 4.23 0.918 1.09 2005/11/18 3.93 0.781 1.71 2006/1/4 4.13 0.652 1.484 2006/2/28 4.35 0.501 1.614
2005/9/30 4.28 0.915 1.09 2005/11/21 3.94 0.773 1.9 2006/1/5 4.18 0.649 1.634
2005/10/10 4.22 0.888 1.06 2005/11/22 3.88 0.770 1.88 2006/1/6 4.15 0.647 1.591
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Table 3. Comparison of Predicted Prices and Observed Prices. 
Date  Call(observed) Predicted Difference Date  Call(observed) Predicted Difference Date  Call(observed) Predicted Difference Date  Call(observed) Predicted Difference
8/22/2005 1.26 0.88 38% 10/11/2005 1.03 0.36 67% 11/23/2005 2.03 0.39 164% 1/9/2006 1.58 0.45 113%
8/23/2005 1.59 0.83 76% 10/12/2005 1.03 0.39 64% 11/24/2005 3.01 0.42 259% 1/11/2006 1.61 0.37 123%
8/24/2005 1.81 0.77 104% 10/13/2005 1.05 0.43 62% 11/25/2005 1.95 0.36 159% 1/12/2006 1.52 0.40 112%
8/25/2005 1.83 0.81 102% 10/14/2005 1 0.51 49% 11/28/2005 1.61 0.34 127% 1/13/2006 1.50 0.44 106%
8/26/2005 1.81 0.81 100% 10/17/2005 0.95 0.56 39% 11/29/2005 1.49 0.32 117% 1/16/2006 1.53 0.43 109%
8/29/2005 1.67 0.71 96% 10/18/2005 0.93 0.37 56% 11/30/2005 1.66 0.29 137% 1/17/2006 1.51 0.35 116%
8/30/2005 1.41 0.73 68% 10/19/2005 0.91 0.37 54% 12/1/2005 1.82 0.24 158% 1/18/2006 1.46 0.28 117%
8/31/2005 1.52 0.66 86% 10/20/2005 0.91 0.45 46% 12/2/2005 1.77 0.30 147% 1/19/2006 1.46 0.32 115%
9/1/2005 1.54 0.73 81% 10/21/2005 0.86 0.38 48% 12/5/2005 1.85 0.30 154% 1/20/2006 1.39 0.39 99%
9/2/2005 1.42 0.66 76% 10/24/2005 0.87 0.34 53% 12/6/2005 1.68 0.37 130% 1/23/2006 1.21 0.41 80%
9/5/2005 1.42 0.71 71% 10/25/2005 0.84 0.36 48% 12/7/2005 1.74 0.35 139% 1/24/2006 1.09 0.38 71%
9/6/2005 1.38 0.65 73% 10/26/2005 0.72 0.49 23% 12/8/2005 1.70 0.47 123% 1/25/2006 1.04 0.44 60%
9/7/2005 1.39 0.65 74% 10/27/2005 0.69 0.45 24% 12/9/2005 1.60 0.37 123% 2/6/2006 1.37 0.45 92%
9/8/2005 1.38 0.65 73% 10/28/2005 0.77 0.34 43% 12/12/2005 1.55 0.33 122% 2/7/2006 1.62 0.45 117%
9/9/2005 1.41 0.60 81% 10/31/2005 1.12 0.48 64% 12/13/2005 1.56 0.31 125% 2/8/2006 1.58 0.34 123%
9/12/2005 1.44 0.60 84% 11/1/2005 0.97 0.41 56% 12/14/2005 1.55 0.36 119% 2/9/2006 1.60 0.52 108%
9/13/2005 1.43 0.55 88% 11/2/2005 0.99 0.41 58% 12/15/2005 1.58 0.36 122% 2/10/2006 1.53 0.40 113%
9/14/2005 1.4 0.67 73% 11/3/2005 1.12 0.40 72% 12/16/2005 1.56 0.10 146% 2/13/2006 1.65 0.41 123%
9/15/2005 1.39 0.60 79% 11/4/2005 1.31 0.41 90% 12/19/2005 1.67 0.32 135% 2/14/2006 1.65 0.39 126%
9/16/2005 1.33 0.56 77% 11/7/2005 1.51 0.25 126% 12/20/2005 1.77 0.30 147% 2/15/2006 1.63 0.39 123%
9/19/2005 1.31 0.61 70% 11/8/2005 1.65 0.32 133% 12/21/2005 1.75 0.30 145% 2/16/2006 1.56 0.41 115%
9/20/2005 1.34 0.63 71% 11/9/2005 1.16 0.43 73% 12/22/2005 1.74 0.29 145% 2/17/2006 1.48 0.42 106%
9/21/2005 1.28 0.59 69% 11/10/2005 1.4 0.42 98% 12/23/2005 1.67 0.32 135% 2/20/2006 1.65 0.36 128%
9/22/2005 1.2 0.66 54% 11/11/2005 1.61 0.32 129% 12/26/2005 1.56 0.37 118% 2/21/2006 1.62 0.39 123%
9/23/2005 1.1 0.49 61% 11/14/2005 1.78 0.26 152% 12/27/2005 1.57 0.36 121% 2/22/2006 1.70 0.47 123%
9/26/2005 1.12 0.45 67% 11/15/2005 1.66 0.23 143% 12/28/2005 1.58 0.39 119% 2/23/2006 1.64 0.49 115%
9/27/2005 1.07 0.49 58% 11/16/2005 1.87 0.34 153% 12/29/2005 1.49 0.35 114% 2/24/2006 1.67 0.45 122%
9/28/2005 1.08 0.43 65% 11/17/2005 1.93 0.31 162% 12/30/2005 1.48 0.37 111% 2/27/2006 1.66 0.49 117%
9/29/2005 1.09 0.42 67% 11/18/2005 1.71 0.40 131% 1/4/2006 1.48 0.50 99% 2/28/2006 1.61 0.44 117%
9/30/2005 1.09 0.44 65% 11/21/2005 1.9 0.36 154% 1/5/2006 1.63 0.48 115%
10/10/2005 1.06 0.40 66% 11/22/2005 1.88 0.32 156% 1/6/2006 1.59 0.46 113%
Average Difference
Average if no mispricing
Standard Deviation
101.21%
0%
0.3700
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Table 5. Comparison of Historical and Implied Volatility. 
 
 
 
Date Implied Volatility Historical Volatility Date Implied Volatility Historical Volatility Date Implied Volatility Historical Volatility Date Implied Volatility Historical Volatility
2005/8/22 62.61% 40.47% 2005/10/11 76.55% 31.88% 2005/11/23 168.07% 40.34% 2006/1/9 134.16% 42.64%
2005/8/23 84.80% 40.01% 2005/10/12 77.08% 34.36% 2005/11/24 270.84% 40.75% 2006/1/10 135.49% 38.59%
2005/8/24 98.15% 36.18% 2005/10/13 79.41% 37.91% 2005/11/25 157.64% 36.00% 2006/1/11 140.23% 41.49%
2005/8/25 101.31% 40.02% 2005/10/14 68.81% 37.35% 2005/11/28 130.53% 35.41% 2006/1/12 132.71% 44.10%
2005/8/26 100.64% 40.57% 2005/10/17 69.87% 43.69% 2005/11/29 124.29% 36.04% 2006/1/13 133.49% 45.19%
2005/8/29 95.25% 37.26% 2005/10/18 69.03% 32.18% 2005/11/30 139.74% 34.05% 2006/1/16 141.37% 41.82%
2005/8/30 79.16% 38.45% 2005/10/19 69.38% 33.23% 2005/12/1 153.67% 30.36% 2006/1/17 141.09% 36.75%
2005/8/31 84.41% 33.41% 2005/10/20 69.87% 39.24% 2005/12/2 152.17% 36.67% 2006/1/18 133.99% 38.04%
2005/9/1 84.52% 36.59% 2005/10/21 67.32% 34.94% 2005/12/5 164.40% 38.21% 2006/1/19 130.36% 41.59%
2005/9/2 78.90% 34.03% 2005/10/24 68.03% 32.37% 2005/12/6 145.05% 41.17% 2006/1/20 124.64% 43.35%
2005/9/5 79.67% 37.24% 2005/10/25 66.09% 33.22% 2005/12/7 147.80% 37.70% 2006/1/23 108.79% 39.48%
2005/9/6 80.19% 36.13% 2005/10/26 60.97% 44.88% 2005/12/8 146.83% 48.05% 2006/1/24 100.63% 46.20%
2005/9/7 80.52% 35.74% 2005/10/27 61.22% 44.12% 2005/12/9 136.24% 39.60% 2006/1/25 96.42% 46.14%
2005/9/8 80.43% 36.56% 2005/10/28 65.04% 35.22% 2005/12/12 134.07% 37.44% 2006/2/6 122.92% 44.53%
2005/9/9 80.76% 32.30% 2005/10/31 89.50% 44.29% 2005/12/13 137.02% 36.73% 2006/2/7 145.70% 36.27%
2005/9/12 82.19% 31.53% 2005/11/1 81.41% 41.67% 2005/12/14 136.39% 40.69% 2006/2/8 142.00% 50.59%
2005/9/13 81.69% 28.67% 2005/11/2 81.30% 40.40% 2005/12/15 138.83% 40.57% 2006/2/9 145.07% 41.72%
2005/9/14 80.34% 35.96% 2005/11/3 93.11% 41.13% 2005/12/16 134.98% 18.90% 2006/2/10 138.30% 41.91%
2005/9/15 79.42% 31.92% 2005/11/4 105.59% 40.63% 2005/12/19 144.26% 35.82% 2006/2/13 150.82% 41.08%
2005/9/16 76.18% 29.61% 2005/11/7 122.60% 30.07% 2005/12/20 153.11% 34.73% 2006/2/14 152.56% 42.68%
2005/9/19 74.50% 31.89% 2005/11/8 134.01% 35.29% 2005/12/21 154.77% 36.07% 2006/2/15 148.41% 42.72%
2005/9/20 77.31% 34.01% 2005/11/9 96.18% 43.08% 2005/12/22 154.54% 35.80% 2006/2/16 147.38% 45.82%
2005/9/21 74.89% 32.65% 2005/11/10 118.23% 45.24% 2005/12/23 147.81% 37.89% 2006/2/17 138.61% 40.80%
2005/9/22 74.37% 41.17% 2005/11/11 137.71% 39.08% 2005/12/26 134.60% 39.52% 2006/2/20 153.65% 42.58%
2005/9/23 68.60% 30.69% 2005/11/14 153.63% 34.76% 2005/12/27 132.15% 36.42% 2006/2/21 141.92% 41.96%
2005/9/26 72.59% 30.51% 2005/11/15 142.92% 32.48% 2005/12/28 128.67% 35.73% 2006/2/22 147.13% 42.58%
2005/9/27 71.08% 34.19% 2005/11/16 153.85% 36.75% 2005/12/29 124.96% 34.75% 2006/2/23 141.03% 39.20%
2005/9/28 72.24% 31.38% 2005/11/17 163.92% 37.01% 2005/12/30 123.96% 36.15% 2006/2/24 142.88% 40.95%
2005/9/29 71.80% 29.62% 2005/11/18 140.23% 41.34% 2006/1/4 124.75% 45.84% 2006/2/27 146.87% 40.35%
2005/9/30 69.93% 29.00% 2005/11/21 156.60% 38.18% 2006/1/5 134.60% 42.89% 2006/2/28 140.62% 43.87%
2005/10/10 71.54% 29.19% 2005/11/22 158.97% 36.93% 2006/1/6 133.01% 42.39%
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